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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

PROTECTIVE COLORING IN CORPORATION LAW
By

M

GEORGE

T.

WASHINGTON*

and

CARL

H.

FULDAt

of US have heard the story about the old-time financier
and his lawyer. The banker, so the story goes, asked for
advice about a proposed business deal. The lawyer thought it
over, and then informed his distinguished client that nothing
could be done; the proposal would violate the law. Back came
the financier's indignant reply: "I don't want a lawyer to tell me
what I cannot do. I hire him to tell me how to do what 1 want
to do."
This attitude on the part of clients is only too familiar to the
attorney. Then, too, in the bright lexicon of many a lawyer there
is no such word as "can't." The field of corporation law, in particular, provides a rich choice of ways and means. To what extent
is the lawyer justified in taking a client with him through some
newly discovered path? How firm is the ground beneath his feet?
One device-that of forming a subsidiary or affiliated corporation as a step toward a desired result-is fairly familiar: we have
long been told that it cannot be used "to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. ' '2 This, however, is
not the only weapon in the corporate armory. There are others.
not as frequently discussed, which possess equal interest, and
often present even greater difficulties of analysis. Not all of them
are reprehensible. "One cannot do indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly" is far from an accurate statement of the
law; it is not even the expression of a desirable goal. Indirect
action may sometimes serve a very useful purpose. It may, on
occasion. serve a vicious one. Let us look at a few typical situations.
Case A. A statute forbids the declaration of dividends from
capital. A large corporation has an impaired capital, but much
ready cash. Its directors, who are majority stockholders, wish
OST

*Professor of Law, Cornell University.
tOffice of the General Counsel. United States Treasury Department.
This article expresses only the personal views of the authors.
'See
Corey, The House of Morgan (1930) 153.
2
Sanborn, J., in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co..
(C.C. Wis. 1905) 142 Fed. 247, 255; Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, (1912) 12 Col. L. Rev. 496. 517: Latty, Subsidiaries and
Affiliated Corporations (1936) 75-76. For a recent example of some of the
dangers of using the corporate device to conceal one's business identity, gee
Flegenheimer v. Brogan, (1940) 284 N. Y. 268, 30 N. E. (2d) 591.
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to declare a dividend. They are advised by counsel that if the
corporation merges with another the capital structure may be
rearranged. The corporation thereupon merges with a small company, complying with every legal form. It now has a smaller
(but unimpaired) capital, and the directors declare a dividend
from surplus. The bondholders complain that their security has
been reduced. Can they obtain any relief ?
Case B. The local statutes provide that foreign corporations,
in order to do business in the state, must comply with local licensing acts, and that if they do not, they may not bring suit in the
local courts. Suppose a foreign corporation, which has not complied with the local law, though it has been doing business locally,
has a claim against someone in ftle state, and decides to assign
this claim to an individual. The latter brings suit on the claim.
Should this suit be maintainable?
Cose C. A corporation owns a majority of the stock of another, and has guaranteed a dividend on the latter's shares to the
minority stockholders. It causes the subsidiary to be merged, in
full compliance -with legal forms, with another domestic corporation, under terms which call for the dissolution of the subsidiary
and the termination of the guaranty of dividends. Can the subsidiary's minority stockholders have the merger set aside?
One could continue to list devices of this sort almost indefinitely. It is the old problem of form and substance, of evasion and
avoidance. When will the observance of legal forms be held to be
unimpeachable? When merely a subterfuge? This difficult , is one
which exists in almost every branch of law.' In no branch, however, is it of greater significance than in corporation law. We
cannot hope to discover and analyze every device which the ingenuity of counsel has produced-using "device" in the sense
of a plan to achieve a given result by indirect means. Nor will
space permit full discussion of the tax cases and the parentsubsidiary cases.4 Our discussion here will be limited to a few
devices familiar to the corporation lawyer, and will seek to reach
some tentative conclusions about their use.
3
Compare, for instance, Newvman v. Dore, (1937) 275 N. Y. 371, 377.
9 N. E. (2d) 966, 112 A. L. R. 643, involving an attempt to "evade" and
"circumvent" the rights of the surviving spouse under N. Y. Decedent Estate
-Law, sec. 18. ("A-wrong does not cease to be a wrong because it is cloaked
in form of law.")
In the law of taxation, we are all familiar with the problem of "evasion"
and "avoidance," the first being an unsuccessful subterfuge, and the second
being a successful escape from the tax. See Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 4(1937) 110 et seq.
See infra, notes 53, 55, 78-82.
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Elusive as our problem is, there are a good many ways of starting to attack it. We might look at each device in turn, and make
a catalogue of acceptable and unacceptable uses of the merger
device, the parent-subsidiary device, and so on. Or we could study
ultimate aims, and try to discover whether the entrance into new
forms of business activity, the benefiting of stockholders, or any
other given object, will justify the adoption of a particular expedient. Or, perhaps, we could treat the matter as one of statutory
construction and the scope of judicial power, focusing our attention on the factors influencing judicial attitudes. Each of these
approaches is inviting, and none of them can be ignored in dealing
with our problem.
First of all, it seems desirable to ask ourselves this question
What is there in common about the three situations we have described ? In each instance, there is a bar to desired action. Interested persons seek to escape from this restriction by the use of
some substitute device, complying with the forms of law.
After this point, we begin to notice differences. In all these
cases, a profit or benefit will be gained by stockholders, but in
Case C this benefit is to go only to majority stockholders. A loss
or detriment is suffered by the bondholders in Case A and by the
minority stockholders in Case C; in Case B. no individual loss or
detriment is suffered, except that if the device succeeds, the debtor
will have to pay his bills, and the state will not have achieved its
aim of collecting a tax or regulating the company's affairs.
AYe must also inquire about the nature of the restriction sought
to be evaded, and of the evasion device itself:
1. In Case A, the statute evaded is for the purpose of safeguarding the corporate capital, and is primarily for the protection
of creditors. The device employed-that of a merger with another company-is not in itself illegal. It is arguable, however,
that it is a privilege, not intended by the legislature to be exercised
for this purpose.
2. In Case B, the statute is intended to enforce the state's
supervisory power over foreign corporations. The device employed-that of assigning a claim-is not illegal.
3. In Case C, we have an evasion of a contract obligation, The
merger device, as in Case A, may be said to have been intended
for another and more appropriate purpose. But perhaps it can be
argued, in both these cases, that the merger privilege existed prior
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to the contract, and that, therefore, it formed part of the contract
terms.
We have now posed at least four questions which seem pertinent, though they overlap and though not all will need to be
answered in every case. (1) What loss will result to individuals
(or groups, such as stockholders or creditors) affected by the
device? (2) What profit or benefit will result to the originator
of it? (3) What policy would be served by rejecting the device?
(4) What policy would be served by sustaining it?
II
In the decided cases, these questions are not always explicitly
dicussed or completely answered. Take, first of all, the problem
of loss. Damage to one group may produce a benefit to anotherand in many cases that is the very reason a particular scheme
has been arranged. Certain patterns become discernible when we
mark out the areas of conflict--creditors against stockholders,
stockholder faction against stockholder faction, and creditor group
against creditor group-and look for the Queensbury rules prevailing in each. In the discussion which follows, some of the more
interesting cases in each category will be briefly mentioned, after
which an attempt will be made to discover what elements these
profit and loss cases have in common. In the concluding sections,
cases will be considered in which there is no claim of loss, but an
evasive scheme is attacked on other grounds.
Creditors v. Stockholders (or Directors). In Case A, we had
an example of a complaint by creditors against a device designed
to benefit stockholders. That case was derived from Small v.
Sullivan, a decision of the New York court of appeals.' The Interborough-Mletropolitan Company, the corporation there involved,
was a holding company owning subsidiaries with net assets of
about $52,000,000. Its capital had become impaired, and no dividends could be declared, though the company had substantial current assets. At that time, the New York statute prohibited reduction of capital if the debts and liabilities (here $153,000,000)
would exceed the amount of the proposed reduced capital (here
$50,000,000), and a capital stock reduction was, therefore, not
feasible. The directors, who were also majority stockholders,
thereupon caused the company to merge with a small trading corporation. -with assets of $550. The merged companies came out
5(1927) 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261, noted (1928) 13 Corn. L. Q. 276.
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with a capital of $50,000,000 and a surplus of $2,000,000. The
directors then declared a dividend. Bondholders of the Interborough brought suit against the directors for an illegal misappropriation of corporate assets. The plaintiffs asserted that the
consolidation was a colorable subterfuge "for the very purpose of
wrongfully and fraudulently taking the assets . . . and distributing
it among themselves. . . ." The majority of the court of appeals

held that the complaint stated a cause of action. Said judge Crane,
speaking for the majority :6
"I know of no forms of law. statutory or otherwise, which may
not be used for the accomplishment of a fraud or for the illegal
purposes of wrongfully obtaining money, if people so desire to
use them, and I know of no form of law or statute which will
prevent a court of equity from seeking out the fraud, looking beyond the forms to the actual facts and compelling restitution.
Compliance with forms of law does not amount to absolution for
fraud."
Judge Lehman dissented, pointing out that the company had
assets of $52,000,000 over and above its debts, and that the statutes
had subsequently been amended to permit a stock reduction and
dividend declaration in such cases. He added :7
,*...
it is said that in this case the consolidation was only a
form or subterfuge intended to accomplish an unlawful result,
viz., the distribution of income received by a corporation while its
capital was impaired. Undoubtedly the inference is clear that the
consolidation of a corporation having net assets of $52,000,000
with a corporation with assets of $550 was only a form used to
accomplish the distribution of corporate assets otherwise forbidden. It does not follow that the subsequent distribution was
unlawful. It is true that the time has passed when the courts will
permit an unlawful result to be achieved, even by means which are
not themselves illegal. The law may not be circumvented by
subterfuges and the courts will look behind the form to determine
whether an act is inherently unlawful. Distinction must neertheless be drawn between cases where a result is itself wrongful and
unlawful regardless of the means by which it is accomplished, and
cases where the wrong or illegality is inherent only in the means
by which the result is attained. In the latter cases there is no evasion of the law where legal means are substituted for those which
are prohibited.
"Here there was no fraud on creditors or other inherent wrong
in distribution of income by a corporation having net assets of
$52,000.000 above its debts and obligations. .

.

. True, the con-

solidation was made only because the machinery provided at that
6(1927) 245 N. Y. 343, 354, 157 N. E. 261.
-(1927) 245 N. Y. 343, 360, 157 N. E. 261.

PROTECTIVE COLORING IN CORPORATION LAW

829

time for reduction of capital of a corporation which maintained
its separate identity could not be used. It was not, however, unlawful at that time to achieve by the use of a more cumbersome
method the result which today might lawfully be accomplished
more directly." (Italics added.)
The difference in point of view in these two opinions evidently
hinges on the attitude to be adopted toward the dividend statute,
and toward the declaration of dividends. "Fraud" is the stigma we
cast on the stockholders' purpose if we think of their desire for
dividends in this situation as being completely unjustified and unprivileged. Query, however, whether this type of "fraud" bears
much resemblance to the type of transaction usually described
as fraudulent by the business community. At least the creditors
still had a cushion of $50,000,000 after payment of the dividend.
Closely related to the scheme presented in the Small Case is
that which was used in Hai-cy Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella
Co." There the corporation had been organized to take over the
assets of two competing firms, paying $8,000 for one property and
$1,700 for the other. The owners of these businesses borrowed
these amounts from a bank and indorsed to the corporation the
checks representing the proceeds of the loan. The treasurer of
the corporation then drew checks for these anounts on another
bank and handed them to the owners in payment for the assets.
The proceeds of these checks were then used by them to pay up
the loans. Furthermore, one subscriber of stock had borrowed
$1,000 from a bank and given the check of the bank to one of
the directors of the corporation; the next day he received from
the corporation $1,000 in cash against his note for the same
amnount, payable to the corporation. He then used the $1,000 to
pay back the loan made to him by the bank. A statute at that
time provided that corporate stock must be paid in cash and that
no note given by a stockholder should be considered as payment
of stock.' The statute also imposed liability for the corporate debts
8(1906) 193 Mass. 138, 78 N. E. 886. Compare Pepper v. Litton, (1939)
308 U. S. 295, 60 Sup. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 281.
See also Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., (1939) 306 U. S. 307.
59 Sup. Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669 (bankruptcy of subsidiary and postponement
of parent's claims) ; In re Norcor Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 407, cert. denied (1940) 310 U. S. 625, 60 Sup. Ct. 898. 84 L. Ed. 1396
(principal stockholder of debtor corporation in reorganization may not
form new corporation for the sole purpose of buying up claims against
debtor at reduced price and then present them at full value in debtor's reorganization).
9
Massachusetts, Rev. Laws (1902) ch. 110, sec. 44. The present statute
(General Laws 1932, ch. 156, sec. 15) omits the provision relating to notes
and authorizes the issuance of stock for cash, property, services and ex-
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on any director falsely swearing to a certificate that the corporate
capital had been fully paid in cash. In a suit brought by a creditor under the statute the supreme judicial court of M1Iassachusetts,
reversing a judgment for the defendant directors, gave judgment
for the plaintiff on the ground that there was no real payment
in cash by the stockholder into the corporate treasury. There was
only a simulated payment since, as the court pointed out :"'
"There is no more a payment in cash where the corporation receives cash one day and lends the cash received to the stockholder
the next day than where it receives a note originally in payment

of a stock subscription."
What do these cases have in common? In each, there is a
transfer of assets to stockholders (or a failure by stockholders to
contribute assets). While there is no very pointed desire to harm
creditors, there is certainly no effort to do creditors a good turn.
There is not even any attempt to do the corporate enterprise a
good turn-as might be the case if the scheme had been designed
to bring in new capital, rather than the reverse. The forms of
law have been respected, but the atmosphere can only be described as "phony.""
Other controversies between creditors and management (or
stockholders) are not lacking in which creditors have complained
of the use of "devices,' 2 the decisions based on wrongful inanipulation of the corporation's books and accounting records being
penses.

See generally annotation: "note as consideration for issuance of

corporate stock under statute forbidding issuance of stock except for money
paid. property received, etc." (1929) 58 A. L. R. 708.

10(1906) 193 Mass. 138, 145, 78 N. E. 886.
"In the Small Case the union of a $52,000,000 corporation with a $550
concern seems particularly striking.
"-Agreement by A not to compete with B ; A then forms a corporation
to compete; relief granted. Arctic Dairy Co. v. Winans, (1934) 267 Mich.
80. 255 N. W. 290: Booth & Co. v. Seibold. (1902) 37 Misc. Rep. 101,
74 N. Y. S. 776. Cf. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co.,
(1908) 208 U. S. 554, 28 Sup. Ct. 350, 52 L. Ed. 616. See Note, 93 A. L. R¢.
at 137.
Agreement by A Co. to give all its cleaning business to B; stockholders
of A. Co. then acquire C Co., D Co., E Co. and F Co.; suit by B against A
Co. and stockholders for not giving business of other companies to B. Hollywood C. & P. Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service, (1932) 217 Cal. 124, 17 P.
(2d) 709 (no relief in absence of allegation of intention to evade contract)
Where A Co. agrees to buy all its milk from B, and then forms C Co. to
evade the contract, all of A Co.'s assets going to C Co., injunctive relief
will be given against C Co. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n v. Brandes Creamery, (1934)
147 Or. 488, 30 P. (2d) 338. See also Higgins v. California Petroleum. etc.,
Co.. (1905) 147 Cal. 363. 81 Pac. 1070; Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind
Co.. (1919) 180 Cal. 348, 181 Pac. 780; Blank v. Olcovich Shoe Corp..
(1937) 20 Cal. App. (2d) 456. 67 P. (2d) 376: Specht v. Missouri Pac.
R. R.. (1923) 154 Minn. 314. 191 N. V. 905. and cases cited supra, note 8.

PROTECTLVE COLORING IN CORPORATION LAIV

831

especially interesting.1 3 But we must pass on to a neighboring
area of controversy.
Creditors v. Corporation. In the Small and Harvy I'"atts

Cases, there was no attempt to deprive the creditor of his claim;
the defendants' acts simply reduced the corporate assets from
which that claim was to be satisfied. A further attack is possible-to
aim directly at the source of the creditor's claim, and attempt to
cut it off by corporate action.
In Ducasse v. American Yellow Taxi Operators," the maker
of Popp taxi meters contracted with the defendant Taxi Operators
to rent to the latter two hundred fifty meters, plus any additional
meters it might require during a five-year term: the defendant
agreed to use these meters on all of its cabs, including any cabs
later acquired. About two months later, in July, 1922, the lessee
merged into the Yellow Taxi Corporation; the latter continued
to use the meters, and in fact added to the number in service. In
July, 1923, the Yellow Taxi Corporation started, without explanation, to return the meters to the manufacturer, and in November.
1923, that company was merged into the Yellow Taxi Corporation.
New York. The latter company used a number of the meters.
but continued the process of returning them until by February.
1924, all the meters had been returned. At this point, the original
term of five years still had more than three years to run. and the
ultimate merged company was not using the Popp meters at all.
It was using another type of meter, and had greatly increased

its fleet of cabs. Suit was then brought against the three taxi
corporations.

The court held that the successor corporations were bound by
-13With the Harvey-\Vatts Case, compare American Life & Ace. Ins.
Co. v. Ferguson, (1913) 66 Or. 417, 134 Pac. 1029. The crudest type of
manipulation is that in which an asset is borrowed temporarily, being returned after examination has taken place, a procedure which the courts have
no difficulty in condemning. Morse v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909)
174 Fed. 539; cert. denied (1909) 215 U. S.605, 30 Sup. Ct. 406. 54 L. Ed.
346; Hargreaves v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 68,
cert. denied, (1935) 295 U. S. 759, 55 Sup. Ct. 920, 79 L. Ed. 1701; People
v. Helmer, (1897) 13 App. Div. 426, 43 N. Y. S.642, reversed on other
grounds, (1898) 154 N. Y. 596, 49 N. E. 249.
Accounting devices of a greater degree of subtlety are presented in
Pontiac Packing Co. v. Hancock, (1932) 257 Mich. 45, 241 N. W. 268:
Haebler v. Crawford,. (1932) 258 N. Y. 130, 179 N. E. 319; Irving Trust
Co. v. Gunder, (1934) 152 Misc. Rep. 83, 271 N. Y. S. 795; Matter of
London and General Bank, Ltd., (1894) 72 L. T. 227, affirmed [18951 2
Ch. 673.
14(1928) 224 App. Div. 516, 231 N. Y. S.51; the opinion given is that
of the referee, which was adopted by the appellate court. Accord: Levy
Leasing Co., Inc. v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n, (1932) 143 Misc. Rep.
365, 256 N. Y. S.406.
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the contract, and that they must pay damages based on the maximum number of meters actually used. As to the "requirement"
clause of the contract, the plaintiff must fail. To quote :1
"The possessor [successor] company has never promised to
install the meters on other taxicabs which it might place on the
streets. In so far as it exercises the rights under the contract it
assumes the correlative obligations. But in so far as the extension
of the contract depended on the will of the lessee [the original
company], the possessor corporation is not bound, for the fleet
If I am
was increased by it and not by the merged corporation ....
right, it follows that the possessor corporation is not under obligation to install the Popp meters in taxicabs which it and not the
lessee company has placed on the streets. This result is due to the
character of the contract made with a curporation which is subict
to the statute of merger; and I doubt if a contract could be so
dra,(,n as to accomplish any other result." (Italics added.)
A somewhat similar situation was involved in Berry v. Old
South Engraving Co.1 6 In 1930. the Old South Engraving Conpany entered into a five-year contract with a union, regulating
conditions of employment and establishing a closed shop. In 1932.
the company's officers became dissatisfied with this arrangement.
On advice of counsel, a new company. the Old South Photoengraving Corporation, was formed. The employees of the old
company (all union members) were discharged on June 4. and its
assets were transferred to the Photoengraving Company in return
for the latter's stock. The stockholders of the old company became
stockholders in the new. On June 6 (a Monday), tihe Photoengraving Company hired new employees-all non-union menand (lid business at the old address. The only change of substance
which had occurred was the complete turnover among the employees. The union brought suit against the old and new companies. seeking an injunction and damages. The master found
that the directors and officers had acted in "good faith," with the
'primary purpose" of escaping from the obligations of the union
contract. He recommended that the bill be dismissed. The supreme
judicial court affirmed the decree of dismissal. Said the court,
... it is plain [that the ol company] cannot be held responsible
for any acts of its officers or for any acts of the new corporation."
The new company also goes free, since "it never contracted with
15(1928) 224 App. Div. 516, 522, 231 N. Y. S. 51. Compare National
Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938)
98 F. (2d) 97, in which a New York company transferred assets to a New
Jersey company and moved to New Jersey to avoid the N. L. R. A. See also
cases cited supra note 12.
16(1933) 283 Mass. 441, 186 N. E. 601.
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the union or assumed the contract of the old company." The court
adds :'"The motive of the officers, directors and stockholders of the
old corporation, as individuals, that is, the desire of these incorporators of the new corporation to secure through the instrumentality of a corporation authority to do business exactly like
the business done by the old corporation without the burden of the
commercial agreement as to the employment of union labor, cannot be regarded as fraudulent in fact or in law."
With this case, we may compare the recent decision of the
House of Lords in Southern Foundries (1926), Ltd., and Federated Foundries, Ltd. v. Shirlazw.1s The Southern company enployed Shirlaw as managing director, under a written contract, for
a ten-year term. The company's articles provided certain enumerated causes for the removal of directors. Later, the company
entered into a 'so-called "merger," under which it and several
other companies became wholly owned subsidiaries of Federated
Foundries, Ltd. The shareholders of Southern, who were to receive shares of Federated, adopted as part of the plan a new set of
articles, similar to those adopted by the other companies in the
combination. These new articles provided that any director of
Southern could be removed at any time by Federated. A few
months later, Federated entered into negotiations with the managers of the several companies, with a view to making new compensation arrangements, on a reduced level. Shirlaw declined to
accept lower compensation, and Federated then effected his discharge as managing director of Southern. Shirlaw sued Southern
and Federated for breach of contract, though the complaint
against Federated was finally abandoned. The lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal, one justice dissenting. The judgment of the Court of
Appeal was in turn affirmed by the House of Lords by three votes
to two. The majority took the view that Southern's liability was
not affected by the fact that the actual discharge was the act of
Federated, or that the steps taken were all in conformity with legal
forms, the amendment of the articles having been effected under
statutory authority.
Of these three cases, only the Engraving Case raised the charge
that the combination of enterprises had been made with the purpose of injuring the plaintiff or rendering valueless his contract
17(1933) 283 Mass. 441, 451, 186 N. E. 601.

18[1940] A. C. 701, [19401 2 All Eng. Rep. 445, noted (1940) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 138.
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claims. In the Ducasse Case, there was apparently a real mergerthe court seems to have been satisfied that the old enterprise was
no longer in existence, and hence could have no "requirements"
to be satisfied under the supply contract. In the Shirlaw Case,
the contracting company was still in existence, and the mere fact
that power to control its action rested in another company could
not relieve it from liability. From another standpoint, it may be
remarked that neither decision denies the plaintiff's substantive
right: the question is one of enforcement. In the Ducasse Case,
the court is saying in effect that the plaintiff's damages are impossible to measure in respect of the "requirements" clause; in
the Shiirlaw Case, there is no such difficulty. In the Ducasse Case
there is the further ground that the "new corporation" has not,
according to the court, made any promise at all!
The issues here being discussed are not, it will be noted, substantially different from those raised in the cases where creditors
complain that the formation of a corporation has been used as a
"device" to escape from a contract. Where a company forms a
subsidiary to acquire new property to prevent the after-acquired
property clause of an old mortgage from attaching,'"' or where
individuals who have promised not to d a given thing form a
corporation which thereupon starts to do that very thing."' we
have a situation closely akin to the i)ucasse and Small Cases. The
incorporation statute and the merger statute both lend themselves
to attempts to create a new "legal person," or rather to take
advantage of the fiction of corporate personality with the hope
that the new "entity" will not be subject to the same limitations and
obligations as its creators.2 ' The use of the merger device adds
the further complication that the other party to the merger may
be an actual enterprise, with independent stockholders and creditor interests which may be harmed by a drastic decree. Similar
considerations apply to the use of the sale-of-assets statute: the
purchasing company may or may not represent the same interests
as the selling company. In Small v. Sullivan and the Berry Case,
the other company participating in the combination represented
exactly the same interests as the original enterprise: there were
no outside interests which required protection.
See Latty. Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations. (1936) 75-76. and

cases cited.
2OSee cases cited supra note 12.

2
1See Note. Efficacy of the corporate entity in evasions of statutev,
(1941) 26 Iowa L. Rev. 350.
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Mitority Stockholders v. Majority Stockholders. Cases in
which minorities attack corporate acts intended to benefit the
majority stockholders constitute the largest single body of authority on the use of "protective coloring." The defendants are often
the directors and officers; the majority stockholders may not be
named at all. Yet the real contest is between minority and majority. Examples of the devices considered in these cases include
the following:
(a) A statute permits the dissolution of the corporation on
majority vote of the stockholders; the majority seek to effect a
dissolution in order to "freeze out" the minority, intending to
carry on the business without them. Held (by most courts)
unlawful.

22

(b) The majority (as in Case C) has guaranteed to the
minority a dividend on the company's shares; in order to relieve
themselves from this guaranty, the majority vote for a dissolution.
intending to continue the company's business through a new corporation. Held (by most courts) unlawful.?
(c) The majority use the statute permitting sale of all the
corporation's assets as a means of dissolution, availing themselves of the sales statute because they were already stockholders
in the purchasing company, and because the continuance of the
selling corporation's business in its present form is forbidden by
another statute, though the latter statute would not prevent tile
2 Ervin v. Oregon R. & N. Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1886) 27 Fed. 625; Lane

& Co. v. MNaple Cotton Mills, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1915) 226 F. (2d) 692;
Nave-McCord Merc. Co. v. Ranney, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d)
383; Garrett v. Reid-Cashion L. & C. Co., (1928) 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac.
1044; Doe Run Lead Co. v. Mfaynard, (1920) 283 Mo. 646, 22-3 S. Ar. 600;
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., (1919) 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E.
148; Hamm v. Christian Herald Corp., (1932) 236 App. Div. 639. 260
N. Y. S. 743; Major v. American Malt & Grain Co., (1920) 110 Misc.
Rep. 132, 181 N. Y. S. 152; Welt v. The Beachcomber, Inc., (1937) 166
Misc. Rep. 29, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 177; Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co..
(1904) 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004. But see Green v. Bennett, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1908) 110 S. W. 108; cf. Kroger . Jaburg, (1931) 231 App. Div.
641, 248 N. Y. S. 387 (bad faith not to dissolve, under facts showvn). Consult Fain, Limitations of the Statutory Power of the Majority Stockholders
to Dissolve a Corporation, (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 677; Berle, Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1070; Lattin.
Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority
Stockholders, (1932) 30 IMich. L. Rev. 645.
23
Wessel v. Crosse & Blackwell, Ltd., (1934) 152 Misc. Rep. 814, 274
N. Y. S. 980, noted (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 444. Accord: Bid v. Crosse &
Blackwell, Ltd., (1932) 147 Misc. Rep. 718, 264 N. Y. S. S18. See Note,
Validity, construction, and application of guaranty of corporate stock, or
dividends thereon, by one other than corporation, 107 A. L. R. 1171. Contra.
Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distributing Co.. (C.C. X. J. 1902)
114 Fed. 491.
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purchasing company from continuing in the same line of business. Field (by the New Jersey court) unlawful.'*'
(d) The majority stockholder causes the corporation to merge
with another, as a means of complying (at mininmum loss to the
majority) with a statute requiring the majority stockholder to
relinquish its holdings in the corporation. Held (by the New York
court) lawful.2 '
(e) The majority of G Co. stockholders use the sale-of-assets
statute as a means of effecting a reorganization, the plan providing
that the assets of G are to be sold to W Co.. but that the purchase
price is not to be paid to G: instead, the stockholders of (; are to
receive shares of stock of NV directly from XV, apparently for tax
reasons. Held (by the Delaware court) unlawful, though the coinplainants were barred by laches from injunctive relief."'
(f ) The majoritv use the dissolution statute as a first step
toward effecting a consolidation with a foreign corporation. I leld
(by the New Jersey court) unlawful, as such a combination could
not have been effected directly under the consolidation statute?."
(g) The majority seek to have the corporation merged with
another company. the plan providing for the abrogation of contracts between the majority and the corporation under which (in
effect) the majority have guaranteed the dividends receivable Ab
the minority. Held (by the New Jersey court) unlawful.""
(Ih) The majority cause the corporation to reduce its autlhoized capital stock, with the intention of benefiting those stockholders who had not paid their stock subscriptions in full. I leld
(by the *isconsin court) unlawful.2
2

4Meyerhoff v. Bankers' Securities, Inc., (1929) 105 N. J. Eq. 76, 147
Atd. 105.
25SColby v. Equitable Trust Co., (1908) 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. S.
978, aff'd without opinion (1908) 192 N. Y. 535, 84 N. E. 1111. For the
motive behind the merger, see Morse v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., (1908)
124 26
App. Div. 235, 240, 108 N. Y. S.986.
Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., (1928) 16 Del. Ch. 44. 141 .\tl. 54.
The opinion states, at p. 54: "If the majority insisted on a sale a,
the method of reorganizing this company's affairs, the complainants as stockholders were entitled to insist that the sale which was being forced on theu.
and not something else, should constitute the entire extent of their submission."
-7William B. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., (1912) 79 N. .1.
Eq. 580, 82 Atl. 930. Cf. Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., (1907) 73 N. J.
Eq. 72, 67 Ad. 657, reversed (1909) 75 N. J.Eq. 229, 72 Atd. 126, discussed
infra note 76.
"sOutwater v. Public Service Corp., (1928) 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143
At. 729, decree affirmed, (1929) 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 Atd. 916. The
burden was held to be on the majority to show the fairness of the plan;
under the facts, this burden could not be sustained.
29Theis v. Durr. (1905) 125 Wis. 651, 660. 104 N. W. 985, 1 L. R. A.
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(i) The directors increase the corporate capital, complying
with the applicable statute, but using the increased stock in the
purchase of worthless property for the purpose and with the result
of depriving a minority stockholder of his relative share in the
corporate property. Held (by the New York court) unlawful3 0
(j) The directors transfer certain corporate assets to a newly
formed subsidiary, and then offer the subsidiary's stock to the
company's stockholders at a cash price; a stockholder objects, on
the ground that this amounts to a forced assessment. Held (by the
New York court) unlawful, as an attempt "to increase the capital
stock of the old company without complying with the provisions
of the statute governing the subject."'"
It is evident that plans of this sort have not, in general, fared
very well in the courts. Typical is the reasoning of the New York
court of appeals in Kavana.ugh v. Kavanaugh Knilting Mills Co.,-"
where the majority had attempted to use the dissolution statute in
order to "freeze out" the minority. The statute provided that if
the directors should resolve "that it is in their opinion advisable to
dissolve," the stockholders might upon a two-thirds vote dissolve
the corporation. The court of appeals, analyzing this statute.
concluded that it was the intention of the legislature that the
action of the directors
"be based upon the belief that the interests and welfare of the
corporation and the stockholders generally will be promoted by the
dissolution. The belief may be erroneous or ill-founded. but it
The plaintiff took his stock submust be formed in good faith ....
ject to the provisions of the statute. Judicial authority does not
extend to enjoining the exercise of a right conferred by legislative
authority. The courts cannot pass upon the question of the ex(N.S.) 571, 110 Am. St. Rep. 880: "The authority to reduce authorized
capital stock was in form exercised for the wrongful purpose of creating

a basis for favoring the majority of stockholders at the expense of the
minority. In short, a statutory authority given for one purpose was abused
by being used for another and clearly illegitimate purpose." See also Perry v.

Bank of Commerce, (1919) 118 Miss. 852, 80 So. 332 (reduction of capital

for the
purpose of covering up bad management of the directors).
30
Vitherbee v. Bowles, (1911) 201 N. Y. 427, 95 N. E. 27, reversing

(1911)3 142 App. Div. 407, 126 N. Y. S. 954.

'Schwab v. Potter, (1909) 194 N. Y. 409, 87 N. E. 670. This case

is still occasionally cited for the strange proposition that a corporation
cannot have subsidiaries. It seems limited today to situations in which there
is oppression or bad faith, and to those in which an attempt is made to do

something without statutory authority. See (1934) N. Y. Attorney General's Report 237; Moore v. Los Lugos Gold Mines, (1933) 172 Wash. 570,
21 P. (2d) 253.
32(1919) 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148. See Hornstein: Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in Intracorporate Abuse, (1941)
L. J. 64.

51 Yale
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pediency of the dissolution. ...

They can. however, and will,

whenever the facts presented to them in the appropriate action

demand, inflexibly uphold and enforce, in accordance with established equitable principles, the obligations of the fiduciary relation. The good faith of the individual defendants is a proper and

fundamental subject to be adjudged.","
Preferred Stockholders v. Common Stockholders (or Directors). This area of conflict bears a close resemblance to that

existing between majority and minority stockholders-there is the
same relationship of power and dependence. The control of the
corporation is being used in a way which gives rise to real or
alleged abuse. It also bears strong likeness to the Creditors v.

Stockholders situation, where there is a similar attempt to take
away or minimize certain privileges and advantages arising by
virtue of contract and status."
In these cases, the courts apparently feel that the "best interests of the corporation" will in many instances demand a strengthened financial structure, accompaniMd by certain sacrifices on the
part of the preferred stockholders. In such a case, the benefit
to the common stockholders appears to be regarded as incidental
-or at least not deserving of condemnation.
III

Let us try to formulate some of the lessons these cases teach.
It is all too easy to say that we nust not use the forms of law as
33(1919) 226 N. Y. 185, 193, 196, 123 N. E. 148. An interesting variant
on the minority-majority situation is Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. &
N. R. Co., (1896) 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043, 34 L. R. A. 76, 55 Atli. St.
Rep. 689, where A Co. bought up a majority of the stocks and bonds of
B Co., a small competing corporation, and then used this control to bankrupt
B Co. An accounting was granted to the minority stockholders. Cf. Chase
Nat'l Bank v. 10 East 40th St. Corp., (1933) 238 App. Div. 370, 264 N. Y. S.
882.
34See Becbt, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter
Amendment, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 633; Note (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev.
488; Meek, Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal
Doctrine, (1941) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 71. We cannot enter here into tbe
central issues raised by the arrearage cases; we are citing merely those cases
which are most pertinent to the evasion problem: Havender v. Federal
United Corporation, (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940) 11 A. (2d) 331, reversing (Del.
Ch. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 618 which affirmed on reargument (Del. Ch. 1938) 2 A.
(2d) 143, noted, (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624, (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev. 822,
(1940) 25 Wash. Univ. L. Q. Rev. 614; Matter of Kinney, (1939) 279 N. Y.
423, 18 N. E. (2d) 645, noted (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 1037. See also Strout
v. Cross, Austin & Ireland Lumber Co., (1940) 283 N. Y. 406, 29 N. 1.
(2d) 69; Johnson v. Lamprecht. (1938) 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. (2d)
127. noted, (1938) 33 I1. L. Rev. 212, (1938) 12 U. Cin. L. Rev. 576:
Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., (1938) 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688,
noted, (1938) 6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 104.
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a. "device" to commit a "fraud" or a "breach of fiduciary duty" or
a "breach of contract." Such a statement is not particularly satisfying-though vagueness in these matters may sometimes serve
a useful purpose. Reckless drivers may stay farther away from
the precipice if they know there is no fence along the brink.
In some of these cases our problem can be phrased as one of
statutory construction; in others, as one of contract interpretation;
in some, as both. Where, for example, a parent company has
guaranteed the payment of dividends on the stock of a subsidiary,
and then seeks to remove this obligation through the use of the
merger device, one approach is to ask whether the contract was
entered into subject to the statutory privilege; another is to ask
whether the privilege was ever intended to be used for such a
"fraudulent" purpose. The first approach finds some echo in the
cases,3" but it is the second which is favored in the more recent
decisions.30 This trend is doubtless in keeping with the new attitude of caveat venditor. The corporate enterprise is based on fairness and continuity: these ideals must inevitably shape the interpretation both of statutes and of contracts governing the relationship of the parties interested in the enterprise.
When we leave the reah'n of generality, we run into difficulties.
Yet a certain amount of definition seems possible. The following
aims seem generally to have been condemned by the courts:
(a) The distribution of assets to stockholders, to the prejudice
37
of creditors.
(b) The exclusion of minority stockholders from continuing
to share in the corporate enterprise. 3s
35See Wessel v. Crosse & Blackwell, Limited, (1934) 152 Misc. Rep.
814, 274 N. Y. S. 980; Ducasse v. American Yellow Taxi Operators. Inc..
(1928)
36 224 App. Div. 516, 231 N. Y. S. 51.
See, generally, cases cited supra, notes 22-31.
37
Novel ways of giving benefits to stockholders are quick to receive
judicial condemnation if they are not fully sustainable under the dividend
statute. See 791 Corporation v. Engel, (1934) 152 Misc. Rep. 107, 273
N. Y. S. 322, where a stockholder in a company owning an apartment house

was given a rent-free apartment in lieu of dividend, and was dispossessed

at the suit of creditors; In re Bay Ridge Inn, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938)
98 F. (2d) 85, where the stockholders attempted to impose a lien on the

corporate assets for their own benefit. See also People ex rel. Wedgewood

Realty Co. v. Lynch, (1933) 262 N. Y. 202, 186 N. E. 673, where distribution
of bonds in reorganization was held taxable dividend. With the Small Case.
compare Greene v. Boardman, (1932) 143 Misc. Rep. 201. 256 N. Y. S.
340, where a dividend was declared from capital, but was held cured by a

subsequent stock reduction to create a surplus; the creditors had consented,
and the court found that they were not injured.
38Statutes authorizing the appraisal of the shares of dissenting stockholders raise the argument that this remedy should be exclusive and that

the majority should be allowed uncontrolled freedom subject only to the
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(c) The granting of benefits and privileges to the majority
without granting then to the minority. 3"
That is about as far as one can go with any degree of assurance. The following questions, among others, still remain :
(1)
W'ill special facts ever create justilication for any of
these condemned aims'?
(2) Is it of any significance that indirect rather than direct
action is used to achieve a forbidden aim?
(3) just how important is a selfish motive?
(4) Is a given device sustainable if its proponents show that
it will not produce a loss to any individual or group?
These are hard questions. On the point of "justification," we
recall that many cases discussed in the preceding section involved
an attempt to benefit one group at the expense of another-an attempt generally frowned upon by the courts. Clearly, under these
decisions, the harm our device does to others is not excused simply
and solely because we expect it to produce some benefit to ourselves; it cannot be justified merely by the self-interest motive.
The groups interested in the corporation are too closely related to
permit the free play of the acquisitive instinct. In Mr. Berle's
words. "Corporate powers are powers in trust."'" Management,
stockholders and creditors are subject to responsibilities of the
same type, their weight depending upon the amount of power
which the group possesses. Creditors, of course, are seldom intrusted with power to control corporate acts: if they are given
such power. we cannot doubt but that they must exercise it fairly."
The same is certainly true of preferred stockholders, once they
42
come into a position of control.
necessity of appraisal and payment. For the arguments against this view,
see Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes,
(1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233; and Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory
or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders, (1932) 30 Mich. ..
Rev. 645. See also Note, The rights of dissenters in corporate reorganiza-

tions, consolidations, mergers and sales of assets in the state courts, (19,11)
26 Iowa L. Rev. 303.
39See supra, note 38.
40See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, (1931) 44 larv.
L. Rev. 1049. The old problem of motive in the torts field, as prescited.
for example, in Beardsley v. Kilmer, (1923) 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203,
27 A. L. R. 1411, seems irrelevant here. The relationships in the corporation
field are too close to permit of doubt as to the importance of motive and
intent.
4'See Ripperger v. Allyn, (S.D. N.Y. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 554; Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. & N. R. Co., (1896) 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E.
1043, 34 L. R. A. 76, 55 Am. St. Rep. 689; In re Prima Co., (N.D. III. 1937)
C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service 14705, reversed (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938)
98 F.42 (2d) 952. See Note, (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1009.
Krell v. Krell Piano Co., (1921) 14 Ohio App. 74.
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The simplest case we have to deal with, then, is that in which
a controlling group attempts to defend a device which has produced a profit to itself and a loss to some other interest (such
as stockholders or creditors), without any accompanying benefit
to the company's treasury or to any other interested group. Here
the courts seldom hesitate. The privileges given by the charter or
by the legislafure in permissive corporation laws can hardly, it
is said, have been intended for such a use. Any one of several
concepts can be invoked: the Fraud idea (Small v. Sullivan),
the Fiduciary idea (Kavanaugh Case), or perhaps simply the
Contract idea (Shirlazu Case). The controversy may be Stockholders v. Directors, Mlinority Stockholders v. Mllajority Stockholders, or Creditors v. Stockholders, but the same results will
be reached. This is even true, apparently, of action taken by
creditors in respect of each other's claims: it has recently been
held in a reorganization case that certain creditors who would be
benefited by the release of corporate claims against stockholders
cannot be permitted to vote in the same class with other creditors.43
Suppose, .on the other hand, that our device will benefit the
enterprise as a whole. It happens also that we ourselves will be
benefited, though another interested group will be harmed.
Under these facts, will our device be sanctioned?
In the contract-creditor cases, the answer is reasonably clear.
Certain duties are imposed regardless of motive, good or bad, and
regardless of benefit or loss to the enterprise. In the Dtcasse Case.
it will be recalled, there -was no allegation that the defendants had
brought about the mergers with the intention of defeating the
plaintiff's claim. For all that appeared, the mergers were carried
out for other reasons, and the injury to the plaintiff was merely
incidental. Similarly, in the Shirlaw Case, it was admitted by the
plaintiff that the amalgamation and the amendment of the bylaws were not motivated by any desire to get rid of the managing
director. There were other reasons for the steps taken. In the
Berry Case, the plaintiff's motive was clear. Getting out of
the union contract was the sole reason for the sale of assetsand it is that which shocks us about the court's disposition of
the case. We can only conclude that the court had no great love
for the closed shop system, and that it did not regard the union
contract as being entitled to protection. It is imposfible to believe
43First Natl Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940)
109 F. (2d) 54, cert. denied (1940) 309 U. S: 682, 60 Sup. Ct. 723, 84 L.
Ed. 1026.
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that a businessman with a contract claimii against the company
would have been treated by the court in the same fashion.''
.Ve must recognize, then, that in the contract cases, such as
Ducasse and Shirla-z,, some liability will be imposed regardless of
motive. Creditors should be protected against some, at least, of the
consequences of a merger, no matter why it was arranged. Statutes
generally provide as much. But the relief so given is limited; it
is a claim for daniages. Shall we say that if the merger was
motivated entirely by a desire to escape from a contract, greater
relief should be given, i.e., the setting aside of the merger, or the
specific enforcement of the contract against the merged enterprise?
Such authority as has been found supports this conclusion.'" If
the device is to be deemed a "nullity," by reason of the fact
that its sole motive is to escape from a contract, the creditor should
be given such relief as will preserve his contracted position. subject to the established rules of equity.
Small v. Sultlivan does not fall into quite the same category as
the cases just mentioned; the threatened damage to creditors is
less close and direct. Here we can conclude that the motive of
the proponents of the plan, and the benefit or loss to the enterprise, will play a larger part. In that case, there was no business
reason for the merger-no benefit to the enterprise as a whole.
The only possible reason for the merger was to carry out the
plan of dividend distribution which the directors had in mind.
The decision of the case might well have been different if the
other company taking part in the merger had been a large enterprise, with assets which might contribute substantially to the
future prosperity of the Interborough. Such a merger would have
had independent justification, and a dividend made after the
amalgamation in an attempt to adjust the contributions made by
interested groups might well have gone unquestioned.
What about the Stockholders v. Stockholders conflict? Are
we to conclude that advantage for the company will justify a device which is accompanied by gain to the proponents? Let us
look at a few more decisions. In Allain v. Consolidated Oil Co.,' 0
decided by the Delaware chancery court, the plaintiff was a minority stockholder, who sought to prevent a sale of all of the
company's assets. He alleged inadequate consideration and selfish
44See cases cited supra, note 12.
45See Dairy Co-op. Ass'n v. Brandes Creamery, (1934)
30 P. (2d) 338.
46(1929) 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 AtI. 257.

147 Or. 488,
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motives on the part of the controlling directors, who were also
majority stockholders. The assets consisted of the stock of a
wholly owned subsidiary operating company; the purchase price
consisted of $50,000 cash and the assumption by the purchaser of
the defendant corporation's debts, in the amount of $700,000.
The plaintiff alleged that certain members of the majority had
loaned money to the corporation to be secured by first mortgage
sinking fund bonds, and that as a result of the sale the purchaser
would pay these claims. He contended that this personal interest
of the controlling stockholders in the sale tainted the transaction
with fraud. The court denied his petition for an injunction, concluding that stockholders who happen also to be overdue creditors
may not be "inhibited from using their voting power in favor of
a fair sale where the only claim of tainting fraud is that their
debts as well as others will result in being paid." The Delaware
court further stated that
"If the ensuing of that sort of result can properly be called a personal advantage, it is not such a personal advantage as could in
reason be-regarded as indicating a fraud."47A similar result was reached in the Allied Clicuical & Dye
Cave,as another Delaware decision, likewise involving an injunction suit brought by minority stockholders to enjoin the sale of
corporate assets. It was there held that the defendant majority
stockholders could not be denied a voice upon the question of
sale merely because in the event of liquidation they would receive more for their stock than they had paid for it. Since the
terms of the sale were found to be fair and adequate, and since
the decision to sell was justified by the financial situation of the
corporation, which although not amounting to insolvency nevertheless caused "serious apprehension concerning the future," the
fact that some majority stockholders would make a profit on their
investment wag considered as "purely incidental and collateral.114 ,
An even more difficult problem was presented in Licbmnan v.
47(1929) 16 Del. Ch. 318, 324, 147 Ad. 257. But see First Nat'l Bank
of Herkimer v. Poland Union, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 54, where
shareholders, who were also creditors, were held not permitted to vote on
reorganization plan, as a result of which they would profit by the release
of their liability as shareholders, and where the plan was defective on
other4 grounds.
SAllied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., (1923) 14 Del.
Ch. 1, 120 Atl. 486, on-motion to dissolve preliminary injunction, (1923)
14 Del. Ch. 64, 122 Adt. 142, on new motion for preliminary injunction.
(1923) 14 Del. Ch. 117, 122 Ad. 156, bill dismissed (1925) 14 Del. Ch.
368, 127 At. 414.
49(1923) 14 Del. Ch. 1, 18, 120 Ad. 486, 493, 494. To same effect. see
Dodge v. Scripps, (1934) 179 Wash. 308, 37 P. (2d) 896.
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Auto Strop Co? ° There the minority stockholders (49.9 per cent)
of a holding company had made an agreement with the majority
holder (Gaisman), designed to give them a veto power over certain of the company's activities, as well as continuing representation on the directorate. This agreement was reflected by appropriate provisions in the certificate of incorporation. It was accompanied by an understanding that the company's stock in a
subsidiary (a manufacturing company which was the active unit
in the enterprise) was to be voted in such a way as to give the
subsidiary company the same board as the parent. In this and
other ways the minority exercised a powerful influence in the
operations of the parent and subsidiary. Nine years after this arrangement was made, the directors of the parent voted to distribute the stock of the subsidiary as a dividend, thus giving Gaisman a majority of the subsidiary's shares. The minority now seek
an injunction against the distribution. The plaintiffs point out
that the whole system of checks and balances agreed upon in the
past will fall down when Gaisman becomes a direct stockholder of
the manufacturing subsidiary. The defendant directors argue that
their purpose is to benefit the enterprise: that the growth of the
business has rendered the old arrangement a brake upon progress,
that the minority directors no longer even speak to the majority
directors, and that efficient operation demands a cooperative board.
Gaisman-the majority stockholder, and a director-tells the
court that the directors must be permitted to run the company as
their best judgment dictates. It is not disputed that they are
taking this important step upon the motion of Gaisman.
A referee was appointed to hear and determine. Ile found
that the dividend was declared in good faith and for the best
interests of the parent company; that the plaintiffs were not
harmed; and that there was no merit in the complaint. The
appellate division affirmed. 5 The court of appeals, also affirming.
sail :2
"The declaration of a dividend must be for the benefit of
all. If it is done solely for the purpose of benefiting the majority
50(1926) 241 N. Y. 427. 150 N. E. 505. With this case, compare Macht
v. Merchants Mtge. & Credit Co., (Del. Ch. 1937) 194 At. 19.
51(1925) 212 App. Div. 306, 208 N. Y. S. 589.
52(1926) 241 N. Y. 427, 434, 435, 150 N. E. 505. It is arguable that a
distinction should be drawn between directors' acts and stockholders' acts,
allowing the stockholders to hide behind the screen of "directors' discretion."
Where. however, directors and a controlling group of stockholders are conipletely in accord, this argument seems untenable, and the "control" should
be viewed as a unit.
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to the detriment of the minority, then a court of equity will never
hesitate to exercise its equitable powers to prevent the perpetration of the wrong by which the majority are seeking to impose
upon the minority. But before a court of equity will interfere with
the action of a majority of the directors, facts must be presented
from which the court can find that such action has underlying it
a fraudulent purpose and corrupt intent. Obviously, if such action
is for the benefit of the corporation,which includes all of the stockholders, bad faith or a fraudldent or corrupt intent cannot arise or
be inferred...
"These findings [of good faith and honest business purpose],
having been unanimously affirmed, conclusively establish that
the purpose of the declaration of the dividend was not 'to accomplish an ulterior object in the interest of a particular stockholder,'
but, on the contrary, that the sante was in the interest of the corporation and, if so, necessarily in the interest of all the stockholders." (Italics added.)
This last statement is no doubt too broad. The court's generalization may hold good in many cases, but it is certainly not a universal solvent.
IV.
We have been speaking of the problem of justifying a scheme
or device in cases where some interested party complains of being
injured. What if there is no claim of injury? Can we then conclude that the device is sound? Let us go back to Case B, the
foreign corporation case at the start of our discussion. We saw
that the scheme there involved was calculated to produce a benefit
to its originator without corresponding loss to anyone else in the
community-at least, not to any particular individual.
Let us look at two more situations:
Case D. A statute prohibits foreign corporations from operating public utilities within the state, but permits domestic corporations to do so after fulfilling stated requirements. A foreign
corporation causes a domestic corporation to be organized, and
the latter, a wholly owned subsidiary, seeks to operate a public
utility within the state. Should this conduct be considered a meticulous and praiseworthy observance of the statute? Or is it a mere
subterfuge-an invasion which cannot be permitted to stand?
Case E. In New York, insurance agents and brokers are prohibited by statute from allowing to the insured, as an inducement
to the making of an insurance contract, any rebate from the
premium. Suppose that certain individuals who wish to take out
large policies decide to form a corporation and have it licensed
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as an insurance broker. The license is obtained, and the corporation thereafter procures the issuance of policies to the various
stockholders. Later, of course, the corporation declares dividends
from the profits made in its brokerage business, and the individual
stockholders find that they have obtained their insurance at
smaller cost than otherwise. Has there been a violation of the
statute ?
The pattern of Cases D and E is a familiar one. They both
present the problem of whether a stockholder (a parent company
in Case D) may perform an act through a corporation (a subsidiary in Case D) when the performance of the act by the stockholder would be forbidden. 3 In all three cases-B, D, and Ethe evasive device employed will produce no individual loss.
Other examples of the same type may be cited. Statutes often
require that a director of a corporation also be a stockholder. 4

Suppose that we assign one or two shares of stock to a friend,
and then manage to elect him as a director. He turns over to us
any dividends received on the shares. Is this a violation of the
statute, and, if so, what can be (lone about it?
Under the "fraud" test. the devices we have been discussing
would seem to be good. There is no intention on our part to
cheat anyone, no vicious motive. The case of the assigned claim
is perhaps the most doubtful. The debtor cannot complain, since
he is merely being forced to pay his just debts. The state would
be better pleased if we had complied with the law, but we have
hardly "defrauded" it of anything. And our action in assigning
the debt is in itself not vicious or even extraordinary. In the stock
case, we are making the assignment for reasons best known to ourselves-presumably because we think the assignee will be a good
director and will, therefore, agree with us on all disputed points.
\Ve are not intending to cheat the other stockholders-in fact.
we would be perfectly willing to have them make similar assign53Cases in which a corporation has been organized to evade a statute
are quite plentiful. For a discussion of cases under the Elkins Act, see
Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction (1927) 65; Latty, Subsidiaries
and Affiliated Corporations (1936) 68; under the Hepburn Act, Wormscr,
at 31; Latty, at 16, 19-21, 38. A somewhat similar problem has come up
under the Robinson-Patman Act: Quality Bakers of America v. Federal
Trade Comm., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 114 Fj (2d) 393. See also Cregg v.
Electri-Craft Corporation, (1941) 175 Misc. Rep. 964, 25 N. Y. S. (2d)
920; Flegenheimer v. Brogan, (1940) 284 N. Y. 268, 30 N. E. (2d) 591:
note, Efficacy of corporate entity in evasion of statutes, (1941) 26 Iowa I..
Rev. 350.
512 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations (1931) sec. 299, 300.
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ments of their shares if they wish to qualify their friends for directorships.
In spite of these arguments, we have to admit that our conduct in some of these situations does not quite accord with the
"spirit" of the law, or, in different words, the "intention of the
legislature." In the public utility case, we are entitled to argue
that we have done all that the legislature could expect. We have
not really "escaped" from anything. The insurance statute, on
the other hand, was doubtless intended to put all purchasers of
insurance policies on the same plane. Does our formation of a
brokerage company substantially interfere with-this ideal? Is it
a plan which contains the seeds of destruction, threatening the
overthrow of the entire insurance edifice? Perhaps so. In the
claim case, our plan might, if universally adopted, nullify the regulatory act. In the stock case, again, the general adoption of our
little idea might mean that in time all the corporations in the
state would be governed by directors who had had no actual investment in the company, even though the legislature may have
thought that an added measure of protection would be extended
to stockholders by the requirement that all directors be holders of
shares.
Let us look at what the courts have actually done. In the
public utility case, the statute " will be held simply to establish
a rule of procedure, requiring incorporation under local law
but not forbidding a foreign corporation to control a domestic
utility.56 As to our insurance problem, the matter has been settled
for New York by Arcim Corporation v.Pink,'- in which on facts
55
See Il. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats., ch. 111%, sec. 28; Ind. Ann. Stats.
(1933) sec. 54-603; Ohio, Page's Gen. Code, sec. 614-73; Wis. Stats. (1939)

sec. 196.53. These statutes prohibit the granting of any license to a foreign
corporation to "own, operate, manage or control" any utility plant. (Italics
added.) See Ohio Power Co. v. Craig, (1935) 50 Ohio App. 239, 197 N. E.
820 (city ordinance authorizing mortgage upon improvements of municipal
utility held invalid, where a stipulation in the mortgage would give to a
purchaser, in the event of a foreclosure sale, the right to the franchise, since
the purchaser may be a foreign corporation).
56See Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith, (D.C. Ohio 1913)
205 Fed. 643, 673, construing the Ohio statute, supra note 55. Accord: State
Public Utilities Comm. ex rel. Clow v. Romberg, (1916) 275 II1.432, 114
N. E. 191 (order of public utilities commission authorizing foreign telephone
company to purchase controlling interest in insolvent domestic company not
violative of statute, where the integrity and franchise rights of the domestic
company were preserved). Cf. State ex rel. Marsh v. Safford, '(1927) 117
Ohio St. 576, 159 N. E. 829, a foreign insurance corporation, disqualified
from doing business locally, cannot do business through a wholly owned
domestic subsidiary.
57(1938) 253 App. Div. 428, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 709, reargument denied
(1938) 254 App. Div. 785, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1019, affirmed without opinion
(1939) 280 N. Y. 721, 21 N. E. (2d) 213.
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similar to those we have stated the superintendent of insurance
brought suit to cancel the license of the offending brokerage company. The court held that the statute had been violated and that
the license should be cancelled.

In the claim situation, opinions
vary. In the majority of jurisdictions the suit by the assignee will
fail ;59 in only a few states wvill it be allowed to proceed. 0 Opinions
vary also as to the stock assignment device. In Matter of Ringlvr
& Co.," the transferees of the stock, who had immediately reassigned the shares in blank to the beneficial owners, were elected
directors, and their election was then challenged by their fellow
directors.
The New York court of appeals held that the
transfer was "fictitious" and that such compliance with the
"naked letter of the law" could not be tolerated."2 In other
jurisdictions, similar practices
63
challenge of subterfuge.

have

been

upheld

against

the

same

What, then, is the effect of a "motive to evade the statute?"
If the court approves or condones our act, it will announce that
motive is immaterial; if it dislikes our act, it will speak of a
"fraud

on the statute." As an example of the first attitude, we

have Black & White Taxi & Transfer Co. v. Bro7t 6' Yellow
Taxi & Transfer Co..
where a corporation organized another

and transferred all its assets to it in order to qualify as plaintiff
in the federal courts. This was held not to violate sec. 37 of
the Judicial Code,65 the court stating that inasmuch as there was
58N. Y. Insurance Law, sec. 188.
5"See Note, Right of an Assignee of a Foreign Corporation Which Has
Not Complied with State Laws to Sue, (1940) 28 Cal. L. Rev. 648; 17
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations (1932) sec. 8523. Cf. Associa-

tion Collectors, Inc. v. Hardman, (1940) 2 Wash. (2d) 414, 98 P. (2d)
318. The dogma that the assignee cannot sue where the assignor could not
has had an important effect here.
60Northwest Thresher Co. v. Riggs, (1907) 75 Kan. 518, 89 Pac. 921
Williamson v. Aberdeen Automobile & Supply Co., (1915) 36 S. D. 387,
155 N. W. 2.
61(1912) 204 N. Y. 30, 97 N. E. 593, Ann. Cas. 1913C 1036.
62(1912) 204 N. Y. 30, 37, 97 N. E. 593, Ann. Cas. 1913C 1036. The
holding of the lower court, which had emphasized that the complainants
had not alleged any fraud or any damage, was reversed. Matter of Ringler
& Co.,
63 (1911) 145 App. Div. 361, 370, 130 N. Y. S. 62.
People ex rel. Matthiessen v. Lihme, (1915) 269 Ill. 351, 109 N. E.
1051; Louisville Gas Co. v. Kaufman, (1898) 105 Ky. 131. 519. 48 S. NV.
434, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1069.
64(1928) 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 681. Cf. Lehigh
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, (1895) 160 U. S. 327, 16 Sup. Ct. 307. 40
L. Ed. 444; Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., (1908) 211 U. S. 293.
29 Sup. Ct. 111, 53 L. Ed. 189, where the transfer was not of the litigant's
entire assets.
65Section 37 provides: "If in any suit commenced in a district court.
or removed from a state court to a district court of the United States. it
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an "actual" transfer, it would not inquire into motives., On the
other hand, in Shapiro v. W/ilgus,6- the court held that a conveyance of an individual's assets to a corporation, with the purpose of subsequently causing the company to go into receivership,
would be disregarded because under local law a receiver could not
be appointed to take over the assets of an individual. The scheme
was spoken of as a "protective cover for a fraudulent design,",
even though the proponents "acted in the genuine belief that what
they planned was fair and lawful." 69
We must admit that in this field much depends on the court's
confidence in the wisdom of the legislature, or, to put it a little
differently, on the court's view as to whether the legislature's
medicine should be given to the whole population or to only a
few desperate cases.-- In the cases involving directors' qualifying shares, we can conclude that the legislature felt that directors
should have a personal pecuniary interest in the affairs of the
corporation." The position taken by any court confronted with
the facts of the Ringler Case will be decisively influenced by the
attitude which it takes toward that policy. If it is convinced that
that policy is eminently sound and wise, it will, as the New York
cou t of appeals did in the Rin-gler Case, condemn the ostensible
transfer of legal title as fictitious; it will not be influenced by the
fact that no damage was inflicted on any interested person by
that fictitious transfer. On the other hand, a court which takes
shall appear . . . that the parties to said suit have been improperly or

collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose
of creating a case cognizable or removable under this chapter, the said
district court shall proceed no further therein. ...
66(1928) 276 U. S. 518, 524, 48 Sup. Ct.404, 72 L. Ed. 681, 57 A. L. R.
426.
67(1932) 287 U. S. 348, 53 Sup. Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed. 355, 85 A. L. R. 128.
Gs(1932) 287 U. S. 348, 355, 53 Sup. Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed. 355, 85 A. L. R.
128.
69(1932) 287 U. S. 348, 357. Compare In re Loeb Apartments, Inc.,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 461, noted (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1311,
where formation of a corporation solely for the purpose of starting reorganization proceedings for mortgaged property was held lawful (one judge
dissenting)
where plan was approved by and would be beneficial to creditors.
70 t is, of course, quite possible for the court to take the view that the
legislature's medicine is absolute poison. Thus, a statute authorizing the
issuance of preferred stock convertible into mortgage bonds cannot be used
to defeat the claims of creditors arising before the date of the conversion;
as to such claims, the new bonds are subordinated. In re Phoenix Hotel
Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 724, cert. denied (1936) 299 U. S.
568, 57 Sup. Ct 31, 81 L. Ed. 418, noted (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 128. The
statute has thus been emasculated so as to conform to settled judicial
policy, expressed in such cases as In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1914) 212 Fed. 357.
73Stevens, Corporations (1936) 612.
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the statute less seriously-feeling perhaps that it has outlived
its usefulness, or that ability rather than stock ownership should
determine a director's eligibility-will reach the opposite resutt. It
will argue that a provision requiring a director to "hold" stock
does not need to be interpreted too mieticulously. - ' that anyone is
a "holder" of stock in whose name shares are registered on the
books.of the corporation, and that an inquiry into the ownershilp
of the beneficial title would go too far.7 Such a court, therefore,
will condemn the transfer only where a director who was enabled
in this manner to assume managerial functions actually commits
some tort against the corporation or its stockholders, or where the
transfer was used as a shield for wrongdoing or some actively
74
dishonest purpose.
What is the relation of' these "public interest" cases to the
"private loss" cases previously discussed? It would seem to be
this. Schemes and devices in corporation law must meet a double
test. They must not outrage either public or private interests. But
these two tests are branches of the same tree: they merge into
the same ultimate issue of the desirability of encouraging a certain type of conduct. The closeness of the relationship of these
public and private tests can be seen by referring back to the cases
in the preceding sections. In the Harvey Watts Case, for examlple.
the court had to consider the public interest in maintaining corporate capital for creditors generally, as well as the desirability
of protecting the particular creditor who brought suit. In ,.lmrican
72Compare the decision of the lower court in Matter of Ringler & Co.,
(1911) 145 App. Div. 361, 130 N. Y. S. 62; the court distinguished between
the provision requiring a director to be merely a stockholder and present sec.
116, subdiv. 4, of the New York Banking Law which states that "every
director of a bank or trust company shall be a stockholder of the bank or
trust company owning in his own right free from pledge, lien or charge
shares of its capital stock at least ten in number and having an aggregate
par value of at least one thousand dollars."
73See cases cited supra note 63.
7aHolcomb v. Forsyth, (1927) 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516: Matter of
St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., (1882) 44 N. J. L. 529, 541; In re Leslie,
(1896) 58 N. J. L. 609, 33 At. 954; Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v.
Daugherty, (1900) 62 Ohio St. 589, 597, 57 N. E. 455. See generally,
Stevens, Corporations, (1936) sec. 153, pp. 611, 612. Cf. Kardo Co. v.
Adams, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1916) 231 Fed. 950, 965. See also Jenkins v.
Moyse, (1930) 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521, 74 A. L. R. 205; the statute
made usury a defense to individuals but not to corporations. Moyse was
refused a loan unless he would form a corporation, transfer property to it,
and cause the corporation to borrow on mortgage, at a high rate. Later.
Moyse sought to set aside the mortgage, but failed. Said Judge Lehman.
speaking for a unanimous court (p. 324) : "The law has not been evaded,
but has been followed meticulously in order to accomplish a result which
all parties desired and which the law does not forbid."
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Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Ferguson,- where a somewhat
similar scheme was involved, the court permitted the commissioner
of insurance to maintain action to cancel the company's license
to do business, thus preventing loss to the creditors, even though
at the time of the suit no loss had yet occurred. In such cases,
the "public" and "private" tests both point to the same result.
V.
Much of what has been said in the preceding pages can be
summed up in a single inquiry: is the challenged plan based on
a legitimate business purpose? Our difficulties turn on what is to
be regarded as "legitimate." Whether a particular corporate act
is direct or indirect is a secondary inquiry.7 In seeking to find out
what the courts will regard as "legitimate," much guidance can be
obtained from the tax cases 7 In the leading case of Gregory v.
Helvering,9 the facts of which are familiar to most business attorneys, the petitioner was the sole owner of the stock of a corporation, which held among its assets 1,000 shares of stock of
another corporation. She desired to transfer these shares to herself in order to sell them for her individual profit, but wished to
avoid the income tax which would result from direct transfer
by way of dividend. With this intent, she brought about a "reorganization" of the corporation owned by her: a new corporation
was formed to which she transfered the 1,000 shares in exchange
for all the stock of the new corporation. The new corporation,
75See
supra note 13.
76
The reader will have noted that some of the cases we have just been
discussing do not fall into the "scheme" or "device" category at all. In the
Allaun and Allied cases, e.g., there is no attempt to do something by indirection which could not be done directly. In these two cases, a sale was
the desired transaction, and it was a sale which wras sought to be -carried out.
In the Havender Case, supra note 34, it wvas a wiping out of dividend
arrearages which was desired, and a merger which was adopted as the
means. In Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., (1907) 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atd.
657, reversed 75 N. J.Eq. 229, 72 At. 126, a merger was restrained for the
reason, among others, that the companies were not engaged in the "same
or similar line of business," within the meaning of the merger statute.
This question -then arises: Suppose that two businesses, seeking to merge,
are dissimilar; can they amend their charters so as to make thent identical,
and then merge? Or would that be an "evasion?" In Clarke v. Gold Dust
Corporation, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 598, cert. denied, (1940)
309 U. S. 671, 60 Sup. Ct. 614, 84 L. Ed. 1017, it was held that such a
course of action was not improper, the merger plan being fair to all parties.
Thus all these cases involve the same central question.
771-elvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., (1935) 296 U. S.378, 385, 56 Sup.
Ct 269, 80 L. Ed. 284.
dsSee Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (1937) 144 et seq.
-9(1935) 293 U. S.465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596, 97 A. L. R. 1355.
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after an existence of three clays, and without having engaged
in any business, was then liquidated and all its assets (i.e., the 1,000
shares), distributed to petitioner. The United States Supreme
Court, denying that this was a transaction "in pursuance of a plan
of reorganization," 8 0 held that this was "a transfer of assets by
one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either" and "an operation having no business or corporate purpose."'" On the other hand. a reorganization
intended to carry out a substantial alteration of the financial
structure of the corporation and the diminishing of the relative
voting power of certain preferred stockholders was recognized as
having a legitimate "business purpose" and therefore entitled to
2
the tax exemption provided by statute.1
A similar yardstick should be applied to corporate transactions
other than tax evasions, and in fact most of the cases we have
been discussed can le explained on that basis. Wherever benefit
to the enterprise, through a legitimate business transaction, is
present, incidental benefits to one group and losses to another are
likely to be overlooked as imniaterial" 3 -as in the Allaun and
Auto Strop Cases.- while the lack of any such benefit, as in
Sumall v. Sullivan and Harvey Wfatts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella
Co., will be the decisive reason for invalidation of the plan by the
8
OUnder sec. 112 (i) of the Revenue Act of 1928 "reorganization" is
defined as a total or partial transfer of assets by one corporation to another
if the transferor or its Itockholders remain in control of the transferee
corporation.
81(1935) 293 U. S. 465, 469, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596. Accord:
Schoenberg v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935)
77 F. (2d) 446, cert. denied (1935) 296 U. S. 586, 56 Sup. Ct. 101, 80 L. Ed.
414 (sale of property at price below cost made as part of plan whereby
substantially identical property was to be reacquired at sale price) ; Griffiths
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1939) 308 U. S.355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277,
84 L. Ed. '319 (investment corporation organized not for business purposes, but for sole benefit of taxpayer who owned all its stock and transferred to it amount due him by third person). See also Minnesota Tea Co.
v. Helvering,
(1938) 302 U. S.609, 58 Sup. Ct. 393, 82 L. Ed. 474.
82
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kolb, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938)
100 F. (2d) 920, 925, 926. To same effect Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co.,
(1935)83 296 U. S.378, 56 Sup. Ct. 269, 80 L. Ed. 264.
1n addition to the cases discussed above, see City Bank F. T. Co. v.
Hewitt Realty Co., (1931) 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 309, where the directors
did not declare a dividend for a period of years, though the corporation
had a large surplus. The president showed animosity toward one of the
stockholders. However, it was shown that the non-dividend policy was
justifiable under prevailing business conditions, and that all stockholders
were treated alike. The court refused to compel the declaration of a dividend. For another case of mixed motive, see Colby v. Equitable Trust Co.,
(1908) 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. S.978, discussed in Lattin, Equitable
Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 645. 656. Cf. Starrett Corp. v. Fifth
Ave. & Twenty-ninth St. Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 868.
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courts. Moreover, in the latter group of cases the transactions
involved cannot be explained in terms of the "business purpose"
test. The Sinall Case is particularly in point, because the consolidation of a $52,000,000 concern with a small corporation having
only $550 in cash was not carried out for the purpose of consolidation, but as a smoke-screen for the otherwise illegal distribution
of dividends. A fuither qualification must be added: creditors
receive a higher degree of protection than do minority stockholders, as the Shirlaw Case may serve to show.
It must also be noted that directors and majority stockholders
have not been subjected to as high standards as certain other
fiduciaries, such as express trustees under a will or a deed. The
courts, in the intere§t of allowing business to be carried on without constant judicial interference, have permitted a certain degree
of selfishness to be coupled with the advancement of the enter84
prise.
The whole poblem of the "colorable" transaction is thus
identical with the age-old question of judicial enforcement of
moral values in business. This has gone far in recent years, and
may go further.8 5 Predictions for the future in so fluid and
flexible a field are not easy to make. Yet it would seem that
the "legitimate business purpose" test, when limited by the other
tests we have discussed, is a workable tool for the lawyer and for
the courts.
84By contrast, in non-profit organizations, the courts have gone far in
forbidding any action which, even though in strict compliance with statute

or charter, and not productive of monetary loss to any interested person.
will nevertheless change the purpose and character of the organization
against the wishes of a substantial minority. Group No. 23 of the Ass'n of
the Sons of Poland v. Ass'n of the Sons of Poland, (1936) 121 N. J. Eq.
102, 187 AUt. 356, where merger was enjoined in spite of legislative authority;

Detroit Osteopathic Hospital v. Johnson, (1939) 290 Mich. 283, 287 N. W.
466, where the charter gave the trustees power to amend by-laws as to
election of trustees, and the trustees now amend the by-laws to permit
election of trustees by all the members rather than by the trustees themselves, thus making possible a change in the aims of the organization; injunction
granted.
85

See First Nat'l Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1940) 109 F. (2d) 54; In re Norcor Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 109 F.

(2d) 407; In re McCrory Stores Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 267.
noted (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1245; Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern
Fiscal Corp., (D. Pa. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 22.

